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Abstract:  
 
This paper investigates the effect of firm-specific characteristics on debt maturity in 
Malaysia.  
 
We examine the impact of Shari’ah compliance on debt maturity structure by grouping 
companies based on compliance status as governed by the Securities Commission of 
Malaysia over the sample period of 2007 to 2016.  
 
The results indicate that Shari’ah compliant firms tend to have longer debt maturity 
structure indicating that the nature of compliance determines the maturity structure of 
companies in Malaysia as managers of these firms tend to focus on mitigating liquidity risks 
potentially faced. In addition, Shari’ah compliant firms also tend to have lower bankruptcy 
costs.  
 
Contrary to their non-compliant counterparts, managers of Shari’ah compliant firms tend to 
change debt maturity structure as a signaling tool whilst opting for longer structures in 
periods of positive share price performance. We also find that Shar’iah compliance has no 
impact on firms’ strategy of matching debt to asset maturity structure.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Studies in debt maturity stem from the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) which is extended in Kraus (1973) as well as in Stiglitz (1974). These studies 
argue for an irrelevance of capital structure as well as debt maturity structure. Morris 
(1976) provides a counter hypothesis under perfect capital market assumptions 
whereby increased reliance on short-term debt reduces risk exposure faced by 
shareholders’ with the existence of fluctuating interest rates in the future. 
 
The literature further provides several theoretical views on the debt maturity puzzle 
in capital structure. Brick and Ravid (1985 and 1991) as well as Lewis (1990) argue 
for a tax explanation whilst Diamond (1991) provide a liquidity risk hypotheses in 
explaining debt maturity choices amongst managers. In addition, the literature also 
documents explanations related to reductions in moral hazard problems (Myers, 
1977; Barnea et al., 1980). Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991 and 1993) also 
show that the signaling hypothesis can further explain debt maturity structure 
choices.  
 
Based on the literature as discussed above, it can be summarized that debt maturity 
does indeed influence firm value given that it impacts liquidity (Hussain, 2014). In 
addition, the differences between cost of financing for long-term versus short-term 
debt also provides a plausible explanation for optimal debt maturity levels which in 
turn affects firm value (Jindrichovska, 2013 and Guney and Iqbal-Hussain, 2014). 
Furthermore, agency costs can be controlled by the utilising the appropriate level of 
debt maturity.  
 
Our paper thus is aimed at investigating the impact of Shari’ah compliance to debt 
maturity structure given that the nature of compliance exposes firms to differing risk 
structures. To test our hypothesis we utilise firm specific characteristics based on the 
explanations in the literature and regress against debt maturity structure for 
compliant versus non-compliant firms. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The literature on studies concerning debt maturity structures can be grouped into 
four main explanations which are the moral hazard view, taxation purposes, 
signalling theories as well as a management tool for reducing liquidity risks. Ravid 
(1996) provides a detailed survey on the four main view in explaining the debt 
maturity structure decisions.  
 
Based on the first view of moral hazard, short-term borrowing reduces agency 
problems. Myers (1977) and Barnea et al. (1980) argue that increase in short-term 
debt reduces the underinvestment problem given that the maturity structure is 
shortened. Thus, in order to finance growth, firms would be forced to renegotiate 
debt contracts which would be priced to reflect potential increase in firm value. In 
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addition, reduced maturity leads to a reduction in the potential for asset substitution 
and thus lowers risk shifting potential. This in turn reduces incentives for 
shareholders’ to accept high-risk projects (Shawtari et al., 2016). The tax argument 
on the other hand is based on the net benefit of tax deductibility of interests, 
whereby firms would be inclined to increase debt maturity structure in the event that 
tax benefit of debt is greater than the flotation costs amortised over time (Kane et al., 
1985; Brick and Ravid, 1985; Lewis, 1990; Hussain et al., 2016a, Suryanto and 
Thalassinos, 2017).  
 
The signalling effect on debt maturity is based on the fact that equilibrium is 
dependent on transaction or flotation costs (Flannery, 1986). In such cases, high 
quality firms opt for short-term debt given that the premium attached to longer term 
borrowing would be unattractive to these firms given that the pricing would be based 
on the average probability of default (Khaw and Lee, 2016). Conversely, low quality 
firms would prefer long-term debt given that the ‘average’ market price would 
attract a premium which would be lower than theirs (Pontoh, 2017). Thus, the author 
predicts that debt maturity has an inverse relationship with firm quality. Finally, the 
liquidity explanation of debt maturity is based on firms trading off the benefits of 
shorter debt structure in order to improve credit ratings versus liquidity (Diamond, 
1991; Milanic et al., 2013; Thalassinos et al., 2015). 
 
2.1 Shari’ah Compliance 
 
Theories in capital structure predict that leverage tends to increase firm value due to 
several differing explanations (Ali et al., 2018). In addition, empirical studies have 
found validated these predictions (Ju et al., 2005). However, Islamic finance tends to 
have different views on the extent of usage of debt in financing as well as the nature 
of debt financing (Zaher and Hassan, 2001; Mohamed et al., 2015; Kamarudin et al., 
2018). Several different regulatory bodies such as Accounting and Audit 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Dow Jones Islamic market 
and Financial Times Stock Exchange also places restrictions on the extent of debt 
financing as well as nature of debt financing (Abdul Rahman et al., 2010; Hassan 
and Aliyu, 2017).  
 
The Securities Commission of Malaysia has similar restrictions on debt financing as 
well as interest income. These restrictions would thus have an impact on financing 
behaviour as well as debt maturity structure of Shari’ah compliant firms in Malaysia 
(Thabet et al., 2017; Iqbal Hussain, 2017; Hussain et al., 2017a). 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Our studies measures debt maturity based on the balance sheet approach and thus we 
define debt maturity (DM) as the proportion of long-term debt to total debt (Barclay 
et al., 2003; Deesomsak et al., 2009). 
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3.1 Definition of Variables 
 
Similar to Antoniou et al. (2006) and Deesomsak et al. (2009) we include leverage, 
firms size growth opportunities, earnings volatility, liquidity, profitability, share 
price performance, asset maturity and firm quality as explanatory variables. We 
summarise the variable definitions, predicted relationship based on the theoretical 
predictions discussed in the literature review section as well as proxies used in Table 
1 (Hussain et al., 2016b). 
  
Table 1. Definition of Variables and theoretical predictions of relationship to Debt 
Maturity (DM) 
Variable Definition "+" "-" Expectation 
Leverage 
(LEV) 
 
 
Total debt scaled by total 
debt plus MV of equity and 
BV of preference shares 
Liquidity risk Moral hazard Positive 
Firms Size 
(SIZE) 
 
 
Natural logarithm of assets Moral hazard, 
signalling, 
market access 
& transaction 
costs 
Liquidity risk Positive 
Growth 
Opportunity 
(Growth) 
 
Total assets minus book 
value of equity plus MV of 
equity scaled by total assets 
Liquidity risk Moral hazard, 
signalling 
Negative 
Earnings 
Volatility 
(VOL) 
 
Absolute value of {[EBITt - 
EBITt-1]/EBITt-1} minus 
average of {[EBITt - EBITt-
1]/EBITt-1} 
Liquidity risk Moral hazard, 
bankruptcy 
costs 
Negative 
Liquidity 
(LIQ) 
 
Current assets scaled by 
current liabilities 
- Capacity Negative 
Profitability 
(PROF) 
 
 
EBIT scaled by total assets Tax - Positive 
Share price 
performance 
(SPP) 
 
Changes in share price Signalling, 
Market timing 
Optimistic Positive 
Asset 
Maturity 
(AMAT) 
 
Total fixed assets scaled by 
total assets 
Moral hazard, 
signalling, 
financial 
distress, cash 
flow 
Priority of 
claim 
Positive 
Firm 
Quality 
(QUA) 
 
 
Altman's Z-score - Signalling, 
moral hazard, 
liquidity risk. 
Negative / no 
relationship 
Souce: Adapted from Dessonsak et al. (2009). 
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4. Data 
 
Our sample is derived from all firms available in the Datastream database for the 
period of 2007-2016. In order to avoid survivorship bias, we included dead firms. 
Similar to the literature, we exclude financial firms (Thabet et al., 2017) as well as 
missing observations (Hussain et al., 2017b).  
 
The sample is based on unbalanced panel data which leads to improved inference of 
the parameters estimated from the model and thus is able to capture managerial 
actions in a more accurate manner given the gains in econometric efficiency 
(Hussain, 2016c). In addition, this allows us to reduce the bias caused by omitted 
variables in order to control for variables that might be potentially missing or even 
unobservable (Guney and Iqbal-Hussain, 2009).  We further winsorise our data by 
eliminating observations in the bottom 1 percentile as well as top 99th percentile 
(Iqbal-Hussain et al., 2015). Our final sample comprises of 806 firms with 6,989 
firm-year observations. The summary statistics of our sample and the variable 
utilised on our models are reported in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Average values of variables utilized in regression model 
Variable Average T-stat 
Debt Maturity (DM) 0.5480*** (3.2483) 
Leverage (LEV) 0.2344*** (9.8991) 
Firm Size (SIZE) 12.8933 (1.2410) 
Growth Opportunities (GROWTH) -3.1811*** (2.4310) 
Earnings Volatility (VOL) 2.9871 (1.0801) 
Liquidity (LIQ) 2.6899 (0.5622) 
Firm Profitability (PROF) 0.0652 (0.3109) 
Share Price Performance (SPP) 0.1055*** (2.9645) 
Asset Maturity (AMAT) 0.4108* (1.7089) 
Firm Quality (QUA) -0.3992*** (4.1088) 
Note: *,** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
In order to evaluate the impact of firm specific characteristics on debt maturity, we 
regress the following model: 
 
                                                          (1) 
where DMit is the debt maturity for firm i at time t, α0 is the intercept and 
γ[Explanatory Variables]it is the vector of explanatory variables to test the 
theoretical predictions discussed above. In order to capture the effect of Shari’ah 
compliance on the debt maturity structure based on the firm specific characteristics, 
each explanatory is interacted with a Shari’ah compliance dummy (SCD) which 
takes the value of 1 if the firm is compliant in a given year and 0 if otherwise. In 
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order to capture potential differences across time based on the compliance status, we 
allow firms to jump in between compliant and non-compliant status throughout the 
sample observed. We utilise the compliance status as reported by the Securities 
Commission of Malaysia and thus modify the model to be as follows: 
 
     (2) 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
The results for regressing model 1 are reported in the first column of Table 3. Our 
regressions control for firm fixed effects and include time and industry dummies. In 
addition, we cluster standard errors based on unit of observation (firm) level as well 
as the time dimension (year) (Peterson, 2009) rather than utilising Rogers (1993) 
standard errors. Our findings are robust to White (1980) standard errors.   
 
Table 3. Panel data results for determinants of debt maturity and impact of Shari’ah 
compliance 
  1 2 
Constant -0.0809*** -0.0308*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0145) 
LEVit 0.1289*** 0.0924*** 
 
(0.0208) (0.0308) 
LEVit x SCD - 0.0506*** 
 
- (0.0099) 
SIZEit 0.0818*** 0.0798*** 
 
(0.0194) (0.0208) 
SIZEit x SCD - 0.0091 
 
- (0.0366) 
GROWTHit 0.0108 0.0099 
 
(0.0322) (0.0411) 
GROWTHit x SCD - 0.0008 
 
- (0.0051) 
VOLit 0.0091 0.0082 
 
(0.1091) (0.0704) 
VOLit x SCD - 0.0033*** 
 
- (0.0008) 
LIQit 0.0480*** 0.0451*** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0188) 
LIQit x SCD - 0.0102*** 
 
- (0.0025) 
PROFit 0.1418*** 0.1322*** 
 
(0.0399) (0.0463) 
PROFit x SCD - 0.0382*** 
 
- (0.0082) 
SPPit 0.0211 0.0091 
 
(0.2433) (0.1922) 
SPPit x SCD - 0.0196** 
 
- (0.0019)) 
AMATit 0.3699*** 0.3201*** 
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(0.1244) (0.1081) 
AMATit x SCD - 0.0245 
 
- (0.2199) 
QUAit 0.0199 0.0124 
 
(0.0315) (0.0411) 
QUAit x SCD - 0.0086 
  - (0.0265) 
Adjusted R2 0.2861 0.3145 
Wald (p-values) 0.00 0.00 
Results report coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include time and year 
dummies 
 
Similar to the literature, we find the leverage (LEVit) coefficient to be positive 
suggesting that firms with higher levels of leverage tend to avoid short-term debt 
and thus providing support for the liquidity risk view of explaining debt maturity 
structure (Zainudin et al., 2017a). Barclay et al. (2003) further argue that the positive 
coefficient can be interpreted as a mechanism to reduce the underinvestment 
problem. Furthermore, in line with our expectations, firms size (SIZEit) is also 
positively significant indicating that larger firms are less exposed to the agency 
problem of debt and thus reduce reliance on short-term borrowing (Deesomsak et 
al., 2009).  
 
In addition, larger firms tend to have lower degrees of information asymmetry, 
confirming the signalling theory view in explaining debt maturity structures. We 
further find that growth opportunities (GROWTHit) and earnings volatility (VOLit) 
does not influence the debt maturity choice given that Malaysian firms tend to have 
concentrated ownership and given the low bankruptcy costs for Malaysian firms as 
documented in the literature (Deesomsak et al., 2009; Zainudin et al., 2017b). 
Liquidity (LIQit) and profitability (PROFit) has a positive coefficient as predicted 
(Mimouni et al., 2018). Share price performance (SPPit) on the other hand has no 
significant relationship indicating that spare prices play a significant role in 
conveying information to the market (Deesomsak et al., 2009). Asset maturity and 
firms quality also has a significant and positive coefficient indicating that Malaysian 
firms are practising the maturity-matching principle (Oman and Koksal, 2017). 
Overall, it is found that liquidity risk, moral hazard and signalling are strong 
determinants of debt maturity.  
 
The next column reports the regression results for equation (2). We find that the 
coefficients for interactions with leverage and firms size are significant indicating 
that Shari’ah compliant firms tend to avoid short-term borrowing in order to reduce 
liquidity risks. In line with the earlier results, growth opportunities remain 
insignificant. Earnings volatility however is now significant and positive indicating 
that Shari’ah compliant firms tend to have lower bankruptcy costs. One plausible 
explanation would be that borrowing from compliant sources tends to have physical 
and tangible asset backings (Thabet et al., 2017; Ali et al., 2018). Liquidity and 
profitability remains positive and significant indicating Shari’ah compliant firms are 
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trying to avoid potential cash shortages and reduce bankruptcy costs whilst reducing 
their tax (or zakat) liabilities by opting for longer-term borrowings. Contrasting to 
results in the first column, share price performance is positive and significant 
indicating that Shari’ah compliant firms tend to opt for short-term debt in the event 
that their share prices under-perform as a signalling tool to the market and would be 
inclined to take advantage of share price over-performance by shifting to longer term 
borrowing. The matching principle holds similarly for Shari’ah compliant firms 
whereby the asset maturity interaction term is not significant indicating that 
managerial actions do not differ across compliant status. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our paper utilises unbalanced panel data of Malaysian firms to investigate the 
impact of Shari’ah compliance on the debt maturity structure. The status of 
compliance is based on the list published by the Securities Commission of Malaysia. 
Several conclusions emerge from the empirical tests. The overall results are 
consistent with the literature. However, examining the impact of compliance 
provides insightful findings which indicate that managers tend to opt for differing 
strategies based on the compliance status. We find that Shari’ah compliant firms are 
concerned with managing liquidity risks and tend to have lower levels of bankruptcy 
costs, in line with the requirements of Shari’ah whereby borrowings must be backed 
by physical and tangible assets. In addition, managers of Shari’ah compliant firms 
are also concerned with potential cash shortages as well as reducing their tax (or 
zakat) liabilities. Furthermore, our findings indicate that managers of Shari’ah 
compliant firms are inclined to reduce information asymmetry by shifting maturity 
structures whilst exploiting potential over-performance of share prices. Compliance 
status however, does not impact managers’ attempts to match debt to asset maturity 
structures. 
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